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IN-HOUSE COUNSEL ACCESS TO
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
PRODUCED DURING DISCOVERY IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LITIGATION
Louis S. SORELL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

At the outset of intellectual property litigation, attorneys are
not likely to consider whether a party's in-house counsel will have
access to confidential information produced by an opposing party
during discovery. Yet, this issue arises more frequently than many
attorneys are aware. The failure to recognize the potential for disclosure of confidential information can cause considerable consternation among in-house and outside counsel for plaintiffs as well as
defendants.
For example, an in-house corporate patent counsel may be intimately involved in prelitigation activities relating to a competitor's
possible infringement of one or more of the corporation's patents.
Not surprisingly, this in-house counsel expects to play an important
role as a member of the litigation team if and when his corporation
files a patent infringement action. Once the lawsuit begins, however, the in-house counsel may be precluded from meaningful participation during discovery. He or she may not have any access to
documents, interrogatories, or deposition testimony regarding the
alleged infringement. Conversely, in-house patent counsel for the
alleged infringer may find himself or herself in a similar position
with respect to the confidential information regarding the patent
that is the subject of the litigation. Clearly, preclusion from discovery and other aspects of the litigation severely hinders the efforts of
in-house counsel.
This Article summarizes the current case law relating to inhouse counsel access to confidential information produced during
discovery in intellectual property litigation. In doing so, the Article
focuses on the factors courts weigh in their determination whether
*
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they should permit or deny in-house counsel access. The primary
consideration is the risk of inadvertent disclosure of confidential
materials. Courts must also analyze the extent of in-house counsel
participation in corporate "competitive decisionmaking" and the
ability of the corporation to segregate in-house counsel from these
decisions.' Additional factors include: the title and duties of a particular in-house attorney within the corporation; the nature of the
averments in affidavits supporting in-house counsel access; the
showing made in support of such access; and even whether in-house
counsel is admitted to the bar of the court with jurisdiction over the
2
dispute.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 26(c) provides in relevant part:
Upon motion by a party . . . and for good cause shown, the court in
which the action is pending ... may make any order which justice

requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including.., that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated
3
way ....
Although a court may protect trade secrets and other confidential
information during discovery, there is no absolute privilege which
prevents disclosure. 4 It is the burden of the party seeking a protective order to demonstrate that good cause exists to support such an
order.5 To satisfy this burden, the moving party must show: (1)
"disclosure will work a clearly defined and very serious injury"; and
(2) there "will indeed be harm by disclosure."6
In most cases, the parties in intellectual property litigation will
agree that a protective order is necessary to ensure the confidentiality of, business or technical information produced by each side
during discovery. However, the parties may disagree as to whether
the "in-house" counsel of the parties will have access to such information. The rationale supporting preclusion of such access is that
in-house counsel may inadvertently or intentionally disclose confi1. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

See infra part II section A for a detailed discussion of U.S. Steel.
2. See infra parts III and IV (discussing the application of these
principles).

3.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7) (1987).

4. E.g., Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 117 F.R.D. 506, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citations omitted). For an in-depth discussion of issues arising in the context of the
discovery of trade secrets, see generally James R. McKown, Discovery of Trade
Secrets, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 721 (1993).
5. Cuno, 117 F.R.D. at 508 (citations omitted).
6. Id. (citations omitted). In Cuno, a patent infringement action, the court
found that the defendants failed to establish that the documents at issue contained confidential commercial information, that the harm to defendants was
"cognizable", and that defendants established the requisite good cause. Id. The
court denied the defendants' motion for a protective order without addressing
the issue of in-house counsel access. See id.
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dential information to non-attorney employees of the party. This
grants the receiver of the information a competitive advantage in
the marketplace. The party seeking in-house counsel access primarily argues that its in-house counsel has particular expertise and
experience which is necessary to enable that party to fully litigate
its claim or defense.
II.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL AND
"COMPETITIVE DECISIONMAIUNG"

A. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States
Although older authority supports the view that in-house counsel of a party should not have access to confidential information
produced during discovery, 7 the touchstone for any modern analysis
of whether a court should permit or deny in-house counsel such access in intellectual property litigation is the Federal Circuit's seminal decision in U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States.8 In U.S. Steel, the
United States Court of International Trade (CIT) previously denied
U.S. Steel's corporate in-house counsel access to confidential information produced by foreign exporters of steel products. 9 The action
involved a negative preliminary injury determination by the United
States International Trade Commission (ITC). 10 In denying access,
7. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1349-51
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that, in an FTC administrative action, the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied in-house counsel access to confidential information of a potential competitor); Davis v. General Motors Corp.,
64 F.R.D. 420, 422-24 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (permitting only plaintiffs trial counsel
and non-party, court-approved, independent experts to access defendant's confidential business information and trade secrets); Triangle Ink and Color Co., v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 61 F.R.D. 634, 636 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (restricting access to
defendant's confidential information to plaintiffs trial counsel and independent
experts agreed to by the parties); Spartanics, Ltd. v. Dynetics Eng'g Corp., 54
F.R.D. 524, 526-27 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (granting access to confidential information
in a patent infringement action and limiting it to "only . . . those attorneys
charged with the responsibility for, and actively engaged in, trial preparation");
Federal Trade Comm'n v. United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp.
1254, 1261 (D.D.C. 1969) (denying in-house counsel access to confidential documents produced by a competitor under subpoena in an FTC administrative action in which in-house counsel of record was also the corporate secretary); see
also Edward W. Murray, Esq., Involvement of In-house Corporate Counsel in
PatentLitigation,ARTmUR ANDERSEN COUNSEL TO COUNSEL (Litigation Services
of Arthur Andersen-Metro New York), MarJApr. 1992, at 11, 13 (citing SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., Civ. No. 15807 (D. Conn. May 25, 1977) (Pretrial ruling
No. 44) (denying in-house counsel access to competitor's confidential information), affd sub nom. without opinion, In re Xerox Corp., 573 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir.
1977)). But see Xerox Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 75 F.R.D. 668,
671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding, inter alia, that in an action for trade secret
misappropriation, the defendant could not limit plaintiffs initial inspection of
defendant's "highly sensitive" documents to outside counsel only).
8. 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
9. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 275, 276 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983).
10. Id.
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the CIT relied upon its statutory authority to control access to confidential information in cases before it," and its prior conclusion
that "[tihe need for access is outweighed by the potential danger
which the [c]ourt sees in disclosure to in-house counsel and the resulting possibility of inadvertent disclosure." 12 The CIT certified
"the question of whether access [to confidential information] may be
denied solely because of counsel's in-house status" for interlocutory
i3
review by the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit held that "status as in-house counsel cannot alone create the probability of serious risk to confidentiality and
cannot therefore serve as the sole basis for denial of access" and
vacated the CIT's decision. 14 The Federal Circuit further stated:
"access should be denied or granted on the basis of each individual
counsel's actual activity and relationship with the party represented, without regard to whether a particular counsel is in-house
or retained." 15 Moreover, the Federal Circuit rejected the CIT's distinction between in-house and retained counsel:
Like retained counsel, however, in-house counsel are officers of the
court, are bound by the same Code of Professional Responsibility, and
are subject to the same sanctions. In-house counsel provide the same
services and are subject to the same types of pressures as retained
counsel. The problem and importance of avoiding inadvertent disclosure is the same for both. Inadvertence, like the thief-in-the-night, is
no respecter of its victims. Inadvertent or accidental disclosure may or
may not be predictable. To the extent that it may be predicted, and
cannot be adequately forestalled in the design of a protective order, it
may be a factor in the access decision. Whether an unacceptable opportunity for inadvertent disclosure exists, however, must be determined . . .by the facts on a counsel-by-counsel basis, and cannot be

determined solely by giving controlling weight
to the classification of
6
counsel as in-house rather than retained.'
11. Section 1516 of Title 19 authorizes the CIT to control access to confidential information in cases before it. U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1467. The statute
provides:

Confidential or privileged material.- The confidential or privileged status
accorded to any documents, comments, or information shall be preserved in

any action under this section. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the
court may examine, in camera, the confidential or privileged material, and

may disclose such material under such terms and conditions as it may
order.
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B) (1988).
12. Republic Steel, 572 F. Supp. at 276.
13. Id. at 277.
14. U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1469 (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1468 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). One of the courts
applying the same theory wrote: "The type of service performed by a house
counsel is substantially like that performed by many members of large urban
law firms. The distinction is chiefly that house counsel gives advice to one regular client, the outside counsel to several regular clients." United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950).
Some courts disagrees with this analysis:
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The U.S. Steel court also noted that a lower court could design
a suitable protective order to prevent inadvertent disclosure. The
court should design the order "in light of the particular counsel's
relationship and activities," rather than based "solely on a counsel's
status as in-house or retained." 17 Thus, an analysis of the specific
facts relating to a particular in-house counsel's duties and activities
is necessary to determine whether and to what extent in-house
counsel access to confidential information is permissible.
Among the factors identified in U.S. Steel, the most prominent
is whether in-house counsel participates in the "competitive decisionmaking" of the corporation.' s As defined by the Federal Circuit, "competitive decisionmaking" is:
shorthand for a counsel's activities, association, and relationship with
a client that are such as to involve counsel's advice and participation in
any or all of the client's decisions (pricing, product design, etc.) made
19 in
light of similar or corresponding information about a competitor.

Because participation by in-house counsel in "competitive decisionmaking" increases the likelihood of inadvertent disclosure, the Federal Circuit concluded that "where in-house counsel are involved in
competitive decisionmaking, it may well be that a party seeking access should be forced to retain outside counsel or be denied the ac20
cess recognized as needed."
Although the holding in U.S. Steel involved the CIT's authority
to control access to confidential information in the administrative
record, the case is persuasive with respect to discovery governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In A. Hirsh, Inc. v. United
States the CIT opined:
While the disclosure of the administrative record under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b)(2)(b) is not technically discovery, it "serve[s] the same purpose. Both are designed to allow a plaintiff to adequately develop and
prosecute its case." . . . Because "[tiraditional pretrial discovery and
disclosure of administrative records are, at the very least, equivalent
procedures... and because the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7) is
essentially identical to CIT Rule 26(c)(7),
2 1 "we may look to cases construing the federal rule to aid us here."

The Court does not in any way doubt the faithfulness of house counsel in
endeavoring to abide by the terms of any protective order. The issue concerns not good faith but risk of inadvertent disclosure. House counsel are
employed full-time to advance the interests of their employer. They regu-

larly meet with personnel of the corporation on day-to-day matters, wholly
apart from this litigation.
SCM, Pretrial Ruling No. 44 at 3, Civ. No. 15807 (D. Conn. May 25, 1977)
17. U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1468 n.3.
20. Id. at 1468.
21. 657 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (citations omitted), dismissed on other grounds, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 721 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). In A.
Hirsh, the CIT denied in-house counsel access to certain confidential information relating to governmental investigations of imported paint brushes. Id.
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Although, the Federal Circuit applied the analogous CIT discovery
rule to decide A. Hirsch, there are many other factors which come
into play under the U.S. Steel analysis which will affect in-house
counsel access to confidential information.
B.

Akzo N.V. v. United States

Two years after U.S. Steel, the Federal Circuit revisited the issue of in-house counsel access to confidential information. 2 2 In
Akzo v. United States InternationalTrade Commission, and in connection with an ITC investigation pursuant to section 337 of the
Tariff Act, 23 the ITC found that Akzo failed to demonstrate a need
for three designated members of its in-house counsel to have access
to the requested confidential business materials produced by its
24
competitor DuPont.
The ITC's protective order provided that either party could designate business information as confidential. 25 Any party disclosing
such information could do so only in an in camera proceeding before
the ITC. 2 6 Although there could be no disclosure to in-house counsel, all of the protected information was available to outside counsel. 2 7 Moreover, either party could object to its adversary's
designation of information as confidential. 28 In the event the parties failed to agree on the proper status of the information, the protective order provided that they could submit the question to the
The in-house counsel was a member of the Hirsh family, and an officer of the
plaintiff company. Id. at 1299. The CIT found that plaintiffs in-house counsel
was not sufficiently isolated from the policymaking elements of plaintiffs corporation "to render the risk of disclosure de minimis." Id. at 1303.
22. Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
24. 808 F.2d at 1482. Akzo also sought access for one of its management
personnel. Id.
25. The ITC's administrative rules define "confidential business
information":
Confidential business information is information which concerns or relates
to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of works, or apparatus, or
to the production, sales, shipments, purchases, transfers, identification of
customers, inventories, or amount or source of any income, profits, losses,
or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other organization, or other information of commercial value, the disclosure of
which is likely to have the effect of either impairing the Commission's ability to obtain such information as necessary to perform its statutory functions, or causing substantial harm to the competitive position of the person,
firm, partnership, corporation, or other organization from which the information was obtained, unless the Commission is required by law to disclose
such information. The term "confidential business information" includes
"proprietary information" within the meaning of section 777(b) of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b)).
19 C.F.R. § 210.30(d)(7) (1993).
26. Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1482.
27. Id. at 1483.
28. Id.
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ITC for resolution. 29 The parties could also employ this mechanism
to permit disclosure of otherwise classified materials to particular
order expressly permitted other exceppersons. 30 The protective
31
tions made by the ITC.
On appeal, Akzo contended that the protective order effectively
deprived it of its rights to confrontation, rebuttal, and effective
assistance of counsel. 3 2 The Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC's decision, initially noting that Akzo never invoked the protective order's dispute resolution procedures to challenge DuPont's
designation of business information as confidential. 33 In addition,
the Federal Circuit observed: "[I]n Section 337 investigations, it is
the exception rather than the rule to release confidential information to in-house counsel." 34 Moreover the court wrote:
The primary justification for the Commission's reluctance to grant
adversary management and in-house counsel access to confidential
business information is that, in order to discharge its statutory responsibility within the strict statutory time limits, the Commission is heavily dependent on the voluntary submission of information. Disclosure
of sensitive materials to an adversary would undoubtedly have a chil-

ling effect on the parties' willingness to provide the confidential information essential to the Commission's fact-finding processes. The
Commission has resolved the difficult and controversial question of the
role of in-house counsel by taking a conservative position on the side of
optimum shielding of business information. Obviously, where confidential material is disclosed to an employee of a competitor, the risk of
the competitor's obtaining an unfair business advantage may be substantially increased. This general Commission position is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. It represents an appropriate balancing
between the needs demanded by the Commission's process and the
parties' need for participation by its in-house personnel.
This is especially true because there is no per se rule against disa competitor's in-house counsel or management
closure to either
35
representative.

The Federal Circuit also approved of the ITC's use of a threepart balancing test to determine whether the circumstances warrant release of confidential information. 3 6 The ITC considered
whether: (1) the party needed the confidential information to "adequately prepare for its case"; (2) the extent to which release of the
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1483.
Id. at 1482.

33. Id. at 1483.
34. Id. (quoting Certain Rotary Wheel Printers, Inv. No. 337-TA-145, 5

I.T.R.D. 1933, 1935 (Nov. 4, 1983)). For an in-depth discussion of deficiencies in
the ITC's approach to in-house counsel access, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW,

1990 COMMIrrEE

RE-

PORTS 251-54 (1990).
35. Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1483-84. Interestingly, the Federal Circuit did not

cite U.S. Steel, discussed supra at notes 8 to 20 and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 1484.
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information would harm the divulging party; and (3) the "forum's
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information
37
sought."
C.

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States

More recently, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United
States,38 the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT's decision denying inhouse counsel access to confidential information of the opposing
party. The plaintiffs and the Tandy Corporation were parties in an
antidumping proceeding before the ITC and the U.S. Department of
Commerce. 39 The ITC granted Tandy's in-house "General Counsel"
access to the plaintiffs' proprietary business information disclosed
to the ITC in its investigation. 40 The plaintiffs thereafter obtained
an injunction from the CIT preventing Tandy's in-house counsel
41
from receiving such information.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted as a threshold matter
that Congress intended the Commerce Department and the ITC to
follow U.S. Steel in determining whether in-house counsel should
have access to confidential information produced in the course of an
antidumping investigation.4 2 The court also noted that, although
the CIT accepted plaintiffs' argument that Tandy's single in-house
counsel participated in competitive decisionmaking, the undisputed
record of letters and an affidavit describing the duties of the inhouse counsel established that he had no involvement in decisions
relating to pricing, technical product design, vendor selection, or
marketing strategy. 43 In fact, the record established that his activities were primarily legal in nature, with administrative duties limited primarily to Tandy's employee benefits plan. 4 4 Thus, in the
Federal Circuit's view, the ITC correctly concluded that in-house
counsel "was sufficiently insulated from competitive decisionmak45
ing" and therefore that no "risk of inadvertent disclosure" existed.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that the CIT applied the wrong
37. Id.
38. 929 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
39. Id.
40. Id. The ITC granted Tandy's General Counsel access pursuant to an
ITC administrative protective order, as provided for in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677f(c)(1)(A) (1988). Id.
41. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1103 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1990).
42. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d at 1578-79 (citing H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 623 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1548, 1656). The court wrote: "The legislative history thus indicates that Congress intended to adopt the standard for access to information set
forth in our decision in U.S. Steel." Id. at 1578.
43. Id. at 1579-80. This was so even though the individual served three
roles as General Counsel, Senior Vice President and Secretary.
44. Id. at 1579.
45. Id. at 1580.
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standard when it denied in-house counsel access to plaintiffs' confidential information:
[The CIT] overturned the ITC's determination based on its own assessment that "[the in-house counsel's] established positions as Senior Vice
President and Secretary do not adequately isolate him from the policymaking elements of the corporation so as to render the risk of inadvertent disclosure minimal." The court found that his positions
brought him into "regular contact" with executives who were "involved
in day-to-day pricing and policy decisions," in the context
of what nec46
essarily are "competitive decisionmaking meetings."

However, the Federal Circuit found that "regular contact" with
those who participated in "day-to-day pricing and policy decisions"
was beside the point when determining whether an in-house attorney could have access.

47

Courts must look at the in-house counsel's

participation in these decisions rather than at what contact the attorney has with corporate employees and fiduciaries. Advice and
participation in competitive decisionmaking is clearly the touchstone of analysis. 48 Finally, in Matsushita Electric, the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed the position that U.S. Steel rejected any per se
rule that in-house counsel status alone prevents access to confidential information produced during discovery:
Indeed, the [CIT's] conclusion here even seems to suggest that general
counsel are automatically to be denied access to confidential information merely because they have regular "contact" with those who are
involved in competitive decisionmaking, a criterion which would disqualify almost all in-house counsel and thus
4 9 effectively constitute the
very per se rule we rejected in U.S. Steel.
These three seminal cases-U.S. Steel, Akzo, and Matsushita
Electric-established the modern standard used by courts to decide
the propriety of in-house counsel access to confidential information
during discovery. All three opinions rejected a rule that barred access based solely on the status of the in-house counsel. Rather, the
Federal Circuit determined that there are many factors that play
into the decision whether to allow access to in-house counsel. These
same factors should generally apply across the board in intellectual
property litigation.
III.

APPLICATION OF "COMPETITIVE DECISIONMAKING" IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION

U.S. Steel, Akzo, and Matsushita Electric did not specifically
address the issue of in-house counsel access to confidential informa46. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 746 F. Supp.
1103, 1106 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990)) (emphasis added and citations omitted).
47. Matsushita Electric, 929 F.2d at 1580.

48. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis in original).
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tion in the context of inter partes intellectual property litigation. 50
However, as discussed below, there have been a number of relatively recent decisions either explicitly or implicitly employing the
competitive decisionmaking criterion of U.S. Steel to resolve the issue of in-house counsel access in the context of intellectual property
litigation. This part addresses the reasoning behind decisions to
grant or deny in-house counsel access to confidential information.
A.

Cases GrantingAccess

Each of the following four cases 5 1 granted in-house counsel access to confidential information during discovery. Importantly,
each court proceeded on a case-by-case analysis based on some interpretation of the factors discussed above. The courts were entirely consistent in their concern for preventing the abuse of access
to confidential information of the opposing party.
In Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control
Inc.,52 a patent infringement action, defendant Sundstrand sought
a protective order, pursuant to FRCP 26(c)(7), denying Safe Flight's
president (Mr. Greene) access to confidential materials produced by
Sundstrand. Safe Flight argued that if the court precluded its president from access to Sundstrand's confidential materials produced
during discovery, it should similarly preclude Sundstrand's inhouse counsel from having similar access to Safe Flight's confidential information. 53 Safe Flight based its argument in favor of access
on the skill and position of its president.
In denying access to Safe Flight's president, the district court
initially disposed of Safe Flight's argument that Mr. Greene was
"uniquely qualified" to assess Sundstrand's documents and that
such access was necessary to enable him to "make an educated
business decision as to whether to pursue this litigation." 54 The
court found that there was a true likelihood that Sundstrand would
suffer a competitive loss because "the parties competed directly in
the same market."5 5 The court also relied on Sundstrand's extensive research and development that went into the product and the
years it took to develop it.5 6 The court noted several factors that
50. Akzo did address the issue within the context of an ITC patent infringement investigation pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337. Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1483.
51. Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand, 682 F. Supp. 20 (D.Del.
1988); Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1166 (D. Del. 1990); Glaxo Inc. v. Genpharm Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
796 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.C. 1992); Carpenter Tech.
F.R.D. 24 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
52. 682 F. Supp. 20 (D.Del. 1988).

Corp. v. Armco, Inc., 132

53. Id. at 21.
54. Id.

55. Id.

56. Id. at 22. The court observed that "the weight ofjudicial precedent does
not favor Safe Flight's position." Id. It wrote: "Courts dress technical informa-
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weighed against granting Mr. Greene access to Sundstrand's documents. First, the court questioned his "human ability" to avoid
comingling what he learned from Sundstrand's documents from
what he developed from his own ideas. 5 7 Second, it was speculative
for Mr. Greene to assert he was "uniquely qualified," as Safe Flight
failed to investigate the availability of qualified outside experts.5 8
Third, although the denial of access might have hampered Safe
Flight in its litigious efforts, Safe Flight could have nominated a
non-technical corporate officer to evaluate the economic merits of
the litigation in light of a review of the confidential documents.5 9
The court therefore precluded Mr. Green from reviewing Sunds60
trand's confidential materials.
Safe Flight lost its second battle when the district court rejected Safe Flight's argument that it should likewise deny Sundstrand's in-house counsel access to Safe Flight's confidential
information. The court found it important that:
Significant differences mark the comparison of research scientist and
trial attorney. The defendant has represented to this Court that its inhouse counsel involved in this litigation neither conduct scientific research nor prosecute patents. These attorneys simply do not face Mr.
Greene's prospect of having to distil one's own thoughts from 6a1competitor's thoughts during the course of future aeronautic work.
The court also observed that Sundstrand would segregate the work
of its in-house counsel "'in such a way as to avoid the possibility' of
conscious or unconscious abuse of confidential information."6 2 The
district court noted that Sundstrand's in-house counsel were "admitted to the Bar of this Court [and were] officers of the Court and
[were] bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility." 6 3 Furthermore, the court said the Federal Circuit in U.S. Steel noted the
importance of these professional obligations in rejecting a blanket
ban on in-house counsel access to confidential discovery materition with a heavy cloak of judicial protection because of the threat of serious
economic injury to the discloser of scientific information." Id.
57. Safe Flight, 682 F. Supp. at 22.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.; accord Digital Equip. Corp. v. Micro Tech., Inc., 142 F.R.D. 488,

491-92 (D.Colo. 1992) (precluding disclosure of plaintiffs confidential materials

to defendant's technical expert where expert engages in non-litigation consulting activities for defendant). But see Minnesota Mining and Mfg. v. Smith and
Nephew PLC, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1587-89, 1592 (D. Minn. 1992) (affirming
magistrate judge's ruling that plaintiff's in-house technical expert, who was

also a co-inventor of the patents in suit, could review confidential technical information produced by defendant).
61. Safe Flight, 682 F. Supp. at 22.
62. Id. at 23 (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 219 U.S.P.Q. 37, 39 (D. Del. 1982)).
63. Id.
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als. 64 Accordingly, the court granted Sundstrand's in-house trial

counsel access to Safe Flight's confidential information. 65
Safe Flight also dismissed the argument that the Federal Circuit's decision in Akzo precluded access by Sundstrand's in-house
counsel. The court wrote:
Akzo does not control the present litigation. First, the Federal Circuit's decision simply affirmed the International Trade Commission's
protective order in light of the appellants' due process attack and did
not craft a per se ban on divulgence of confidential materials to inhouse counsel. Second, the International Trade Commission is especially conservative regarding the divulgence of confidential materials
because it "is heavily dependent on the voluntary submission of66
information" by parties, a factor that does not enter our calculation.
Accordingly, the district court entered a protective order precluding
Mr. Greene from reviewing Sundstrand's confidential documents,
yet permitting Sundstrand's in-house trial counsel to review Safe
67
Flight's confidential documents.
The issue of in-house counsel access to confidential information
in the patent litigation context also arose in BoehringerIngelheim
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Hercon Laboratories Corp.68 In Boehringer, six of plaintiffs in-house counsel sought access to confidential
information produced by defendant during discovery. 69 At the outset of its analysis, the district court cited U.S. Steel and noted that
"[t]he status of in-house counsel is not viewed by this Court as warranting automatic exclusion from confidential information produced under a protective order."70 Instead, the focus of the court's
analysis was whether the parties could circumvent conscious or unconscious abuse of confidential information in the future. 71 In its
consideration of whether sufficient safeguards existed to protect
against the abuse of confidential information, the court first determined whether the corporation could segregate the attorneys in
question from the competitive decisionmaking aspects of their corporate employer. 7 2 The court concluded:
64. Id. (citing U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1465, and A. Hirsch, 657 F. Supp. at
1297).
65. Id. at 23.
66. Safe Flight,682 F. Supp. at 23 (quoting Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1483).
67. Id.
68. 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1166 (D. Del. 1990).
69. The group of attorneys included one of the patent attorneys who prosecuted the patent in suit. The patent in suit, U.S. Patent No. 4,201,211, identifies Edward Mandell as one of the attorneys of record in the prosecution of the
patent before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Mr. Mandell was also one
of the six in-house counsel seeking access to Hercon's confidential information.
Id. at 1167-68.
70. Id. at 1167. Thus, a court should consider each of these factors on a
case-by-case basis. See id. at 1166.

71. Id. at 1167.
72. Id. at 1168.
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[E]ach of these individuals is situated in such a way that if a future
project were to present a conflict because of information that has been
learned from discovery in this lawsuit, the conflicting assignment
could be rerouted to another individual not possessing the conflicting
information. This capability on the part of each attorney to exclude
of conhimself or herself from conflicting work, avoids the possibility
73
scious or unconscious abuse of confidential information.

A second factor weighing in favor of access, according to the
district court, was the "necessity" for the information, on the part of
some of the six attorneys, who were already involved in the action
and responsible for major decisions regarding the lawsuit. 74 Again,
the court found the attorneys' ability to segregate themselves from
other work was an important element in the access analysis:
The Court also finds it reasonable that an attorney who is already involved in this case be allowed to continue with such involvement subin
ject to the understanding that exposure to confidential7information
5
the present case may preclude work on other projects.
The third factor involved the professional responsibilities of the
attorneys in question. In this case, the court gave credence to the
Rules of Professional Responsibility which bind attorneys: "These
obligations offer yet another protection against the abuse of confidential information by the attorneys in the present case." 7 6 The
court also noted that in-house counsel are bound by the Rules of
Professional Responsibility and subject to sanctions just like
outside counsel. 77 After citing Safe Flight for the proposition that
there must be a balance between "the goals of full disclosure of relevant information and reasonable protection against economic injury," the Boehringercourt granted access to all six of plaintiff's in78
house counsel.
In CarpenterTechnology Corp. v. Armco, Inc.,79 which involved
a settlement agreement reached in a patent validity action, the
plaintiff sought access for its "Senior Staff Attorney" (Mr. Pretz)
73. Boehringer, 18 U.S.P.Q. at 1168 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468).

77. Id. The court further noted: "The pressures on retained counsel and the

risks of disclosure of confidential information, purposeful or inadvertent, by retained counsel are the same as that of in-house counsel. 'The problem and im-

portance of avoiding inadvertent disclosure is the same for both.'" Id.

78. Boehringer, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1168 (quoting Safe Flight, 682 F. Supp. at
23). However, in Boehringer,the court also held that in-house technical personnel should not have access to confidential discovery materials because, inter
alia, "[u]nlike the in-house counsel the technical personnel 'face... [the] prospect of having to distill [their] own thoughts from a competitor's thoughts during the course of future... [research].'" Id. at 1168 (quoting Safe Flight,682 F.
Supp. at 22). But see Minnesota Mining and Mfg. v. Smith and Nephew PLC,

25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1587-89, 1592 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that an in-house
technical expert could review the defendant's confidential technical material).
79. 132 F.R.D. 24 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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and its "Director of Law" (Mr. Welty) to defendant's confidential information produced during discovery. The district court recognized
that both plaintiff and defendant had legitimate concerns regarding
in-house counsel access to confidential discovery materials.8 0 After
reviewing the relevant case law, the court concluded:
[A] decision of this magnitude should turn on the in-house counsel's
involvement in "competitive decision. making" which is "shorthand for
a counsel's activities, association and relationship with a client that
are such as to involve counsel's advice and participation in any or all of
client's decisions (pricing, product design, etc.) made
8 in light of similar
or corresponding information about a competitor." '
The court then turned to an analysis of the affidavits of Messrs.
Pretz and Welty, which the plaintiff submitted in support of its mo8 2
tion for a protective order granting access for these attorneys.
Mr. Pretz's affidavit established that, as a Senior Staff Attorney, he
provided plaintiff with advice on general legal and corporate matters, and had no involvement in scientific research.8 3 He was
neither a member of plaintiffs board of directors nor an officer of
the corporation.8 4 He also was unrelated, by blood or marriage, to
any of plaintiffs officers or employees.8 5 The court concluded that
Mr. Pretz did not participate in plaintiffs competitive decisionmaking.8 6 The court reasoned that since Mr. Pretz was not involved in

pricing, marketing, product design or development, the risk of inadvertent disclosure or use of defendant's confidential information
was small.8 7 The court found that "[gliven the technical nature of
this case, the advice of in-house counsel with specialized knowledge
of the steel industry could be essential to the proper handling of
this litigation by outside counsel."8 8 The court, therefore, granted
access to defendant's confidential information, conditioned upon his
being admitted to practice before the court, so that "he will be
80. See id. at 26-27 (citing, inter alia, Akzo, 808 F.2d 1471; U.S. Steel, 730
F.2d 1465; Safe Flight, 682 F. Supp. 20; A Hirsh, 657 F. Supp 1297).
81. Id. at 27 (quoting US. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1463 n.3).
82. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), plaintiff submitted the affidavits of
Messrs. Pretz and Welty with plaintiff's reply memorandum in support of its
protective order motion. Id.
83. Id.
84. Carpenter, 132 F.R.D. at 27.
85. Moreover, his affidavit provided: "Ihave absolutely no involvement in
decisions regarding pricing of products or services sold by Carpenter, nor do I
participate in marketing decisions. I also have absolutely no involvement in
decisions made by Carpenter regarding product design or production." Id. at
27-28.
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 28; cf Brittain v. Stroh Brewery Co., 136 F.R.D. 408, 411, 416
(M.D.N.C. 1991) (ordering, inter alia, that plaintiffs produce tax returns to defendants' in-house counsel and that defendants produce sensitive financial information to certain plaintiffs having the ability to be of "special assistance" to
plaintiffs' counsel).
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bound by the rules of professional conduct to honor the terms of the
protective order."8 9 The court also instructed plaintiff to "make
every effort to avoid placing [Mr.] Pretz in a situation which could
jeopardize his ability to comply with the terms of the protective
order."90
The two attorneys' affidavits were not identical. Mr. Welty's
affidavit established that, as plaintiffs Director of Law, he was a
corporate officer, but not a member of the board of directors. 9 1 He
also had no family ties, by blood or marriage, to any employee or
officer of plaintiff.9 2 Mr. Welty had no involvement in scientific research, but had "authority to initiate and settle litigation as well as
execute written contracts and agreements on behalf of the corporation."93 However, in contrast to Mr. Pretz, Mr. Welty's affidavit
also provided:
I have no direct responsibility or authority regarding competitive decisions. Specifically, I have no direct responsibility or authority over decisions regarding the pricing of products or services sold by Carpenter.
Nor do I have direct responsibility9 4or authority over decisions regarding product design or production.
The district court refused Mr. Welty's access to defendant's confidential information because the affidavit was inconclusive as to
what "non-direct responsibility or authority [Mr.] Welty had over
competitive decisions."9 5 The court concluded:
From the affidavit, I must assume that Welty does have some involvement, albeit probably small, with competitive decisions. If he has no
such involvement, then I can only assume that his affidavit would have
been drafted in a vein similar to that of Pretz ....

Also, unlike Pretz,

Welty does occupy the position of an officer with the corporation. Finally, Welty is apparently involved in contract
negotiations which
96
could involve competitive decision making.
The Carpenter decision involved a few other factors. The court
found that plaintiff failed to adequately explain why Messrs. Welty
97
and Pretz required access to defendants' confidential information.
Indeed, the court concluded that by permitting Mr. Pretz such access, Pretz would "be able to advise outside counsel concerning
technical matters and guide counsel throughout the course of this
litigation."98 The court believed Mr. Pretz would also be able to
advise Mr. Welty (who had the authority to settle litigation) with89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Carpenter, 132 F.R.D. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 132 F.R.D. at 28 (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
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out divulging defendant's confidential information. 99 Accordingly,
although the court permitted Mr. Pretz to have access to defendant's confidential information, it denied similar access to Mr.
l0 0
Welty.
Even more recently, in Glaxo Inc. v. Genpharm Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,101 the defendant in a patent infringement action sought
to exclude plaintiffs in-house patent counsel (Mr. Conte) access to
defendant's confidential discovery materials. The magistrate judge
held that the risk of improper use of these materials outweighed
plaintiffs need for Mr. Conte's participation.10 2 More particularly,
the magistrate judge based his decision on three factors: (1) Mr.
Conte was a "high level Glaxo employee" and a "substantial investor" in the corporation; (2) three law firms represented Glaxo as
outside counsel and thus, its interests were adequately represented
0 3
without Mr. Conte; and (3) defendant had no in-house counsel.'
However, the district court reversed the magistrate judge, and
granted Mr. Conte the access sought. 10 4 Citing U.S. Steel and Matsushita Electric, the court found that Mr. Conte did not participate
in plaintiffs competitive decisionmaking.10 5 More particularly, the
court noted:
In the present case, Mr. Conte, a member of three different bars who
has been an in-house patent counsel for over 28 years, attests in two
uncontroverted affidavits that he has no involvement in and gives no
advice to Glaxo about competitive decisions such as pricing, scientific
research, sales or marketing. In addition, he states that he will no
longer participate in any matter concerning ranitidine hydrochloride,
[the subject matter of the patent in suit], except for this case or other
lawsuits involving the0 6validity or enforcement of Glaxo's ranitidine hydrochloride patents.1
Competitive decisionmaking, therefore, embraces several features. A practitioner must look beyond mere titles and status of the
individual. Competitive decisionmaking may include both direct
and indirect involvement by in-house counsel. It also requires some
sort of involvement in very specific corporate decisions. Clearly, the
function of an attorney is more important than his or her title
within the corporate structure.
99. Carpenter, 132 F.R.D. at 28-29. The court added: "[Sihould Carpenter
determine in the future that [Mr.] Welty must have access to certain information for some limited purpose, Carpenter could seek the consent of the parties to
such access or as a last resort, seek court approval for such access." Id. at 29.
100. Id.
101. 796 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
102. Id. at 873-74.
103. Id. at 874.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Glaxo, 796 F. Supp. at 874.
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B.

Cases Denying Access

In Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel Corp.,107 the plaintiff in a patent infringement action sought to amend an existing
protective order which excluded in-house counsel access to confidential material. The plaintiff sought the access for two of its inhouse attorneys who served as its General Counsel and Director of
Patents.10 8 The district court found that since the General Counsel
was a corporate officer, and the Director of Patents was a patent
attorney, a risk of inadvertent disclosure existed, as both attorneys
"work with technical matters regarding patent litigation." 10 9 As
authority for holding that there was a risk of harmful disclosure,
the Allegheny court relied in part upon its prior holding in Mixing
Equipment Co. v. Innova-Tech, Inc. 110 In addition, the Allegheny
court distinguished Safe Flight because in Allegheny the plaintiff
was unable to claim it could arrange its in-house counsel's work and
projects to avoid the possibility of conscious or unconscious abuse of
confidential information."' The court found there was no adequate
remedy for the defendant if the plaintiff misused the confidential
information. 112 Therefore, the court was unwilling to take the risk
3
resulting from its allowance of access without proper assurances. 1
Of other importance in Allegheny was the plaintiffs attempt to
modify a stipulated protective order. 11 4 This required a higher
standard of proof. 1 5 Modification of a stipulated protective order
results in a higher standard of proof because the parties have already agreed on the possibility of prejudice. 116 Therefore, the party
requesting the modification of a stipulated protective order must
prove that the intervening circumstances have eliminated any prej107. No. 89-5940, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 867 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1990).
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id. at *6-7.
110. Id. at *4. In Mixing Equip. Co. v. Innova-Tech, Inc., Civ. A. No. 850535, 1986 WL 9264 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 1986), the parties in a patent infringement action entered into a stipulated protective order. Plaintiff later sought
access for its in-house patent counsel for plaintiffs parent corporation. Id. The
court denied access, stating:

[In-house counsel] is General Signal's counsel to ten subsidiaries of General
Signal Corporation including [the plaintiff]. In view of this, any designation of [in-house counsel] as in-house counsel under the protective order
creates both a risk of an appearance of impropriety and a potential danger
for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information in [in-house counsel's] capacity as patent attorney for the parent and the other nine General
Signal subsidiaries.

Id. at 2.
111. Allegheny, No. 89-5940 at *10-11.
112. Id. at *9-11 (citing Akzo, 808 F.2d 1471, and Hirsh,657 F. Supp. 1297).
113. Id. However, as defendants did not object to having plaintiffs attorneys
qualified for access to confidential material under existing provisions of the pro-

tective
114.
115.
116.

order, the court permitted such qualification. Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *3-4.
Id.
Id. at *4.
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udice. 117 Furthermore, courts do not want to undercut the finality
of stipulated protective orders. Thus, if a party seeks in-house
counsel access, this desire should explicitly appear in any stipulated protective order. l18 If not, it may be difficult to convince a
court to modify such an order in the future.
In another patent infringement action, Amsted Industries,Inc.
120
v. National Castings, Inc.,119 the parties were direct competitors.
Plaintiff sought access to defendant's confidential information for,
inter alia, "one in-house counsel of each party."12 1 The district
court initially observed that "i]t often has been recognized, particularly in intellectual property cases, that the need for disclosure of
even highly relevant information to a competitor may be outweighed by the irreparable harm that can result to the disclosing
party." 122 The court balanced "the defendant's legitimate interest
in maintaining the confidentiality of its proprietary information"
against "plaintiffs legitimate interest in gathering and analyzing
evidence to support its lawsuit."123 The court then found that the
danger of competitive harm to the defendant, which might result
from the access the plaintiff sought, outweighed the benefit to the
plaintiff from the additional assistance of its own employees. 124 Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs in-house counsel access to defendant's confidential information. 125 The court observed that "the
parties may be able to agree on disclosure to in-house counsel subject to certain restrictions, and the Court will entertain an appro126
priate motion in this respect if it becomes necessary."
In yet another patent infringement action, PPGIndustries Inc.
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.,127 the plaintiff (PPG) sought access to
defendant's confidential information for its inside patent counsel.
The defendant refused such access. 12s Relying, in part, on U.S.
Steel, PPG moved for a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Allegheny, No. 89-5940 at *4.
Id. at *3-4.
No. 88-C924, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9413 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 19, 1988).
Id. at *1.
Id. Plaintiff also sought such access for "one employee of each party

who can advise counsel of-record on technical matters" and "one employee of
each party who can advise counsel of record on accounting and financial matters." Id.
122. Id. at *2 (citing American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734,
741 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
123. Id. at *3.
124. Amsted Indus., No. 88-C924, at *4.
125. Id. at *4 n.1 (citing Exxon, 636 F.2d at 1350). Access for plaintiffs other

employees was also denied, as the court concluded that "plaintiffs counsel
should be able to gain the technical advice it needs from outside experts (to

whom the parties agree disclosure may be made)." Id. at *3.
126. Id. at *4 (citing Safe Flight, 682 F. Supp. at 22).
127. C.A. 90-C-6067, 1991 WL 159133, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1991).
128. Id.
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Procedure 26(c) to compel such access. 12 9 However, the magistrate

judge relied, instead, upon Amsted Industries and refused to permit
access to defendant's confidential information. 130 The judge was
unable to find adequate assurances that in-house counsel in a posi-

tion where his future responsibilities would endanger the confidentiality of the information. 13 1 When the district court ratified the
magistrate judge's findings, 13 2 PPG filed a petition, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1651,133 to the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus di-

recting the district court to certify Mr. Levin as "Qualified Counsel"
having access to defendant's confidential information under the
protective order. 1. PPG argued that its in-house counsel's primary
responsibilities were to "actively participate in the conduct of all
patent infringement litigation and make the major decisions respecting its conduct and resolution."135 Moreover, PPG stated: "Because it is PPG's intent that the person occupying the position of
Associate Corporate Patent Counsel be fully involved in all patent
infringement litigation, Mr. Levin has been isolated from any busi1 36
ness or technical decision making responsibilities or authority."
Essentially, PPG's in-house counsel did not serve a dual purpose, or
129. Id.
130. See id. at *2 (quoting the magistrate's April 9, 1991 observations).
131. Id. The court observed:
[Als a general matter, it is preferable to restrict access to highly confidential competitive and trade secret information to outside counsel and experts. Regardless of an occasional statement of some courts to the
contrary, house counsel are subject to pressures different from those which
outside counsel face, if only that their own economic well-being is inextricably bound up with their employer's. Moreover, house counsel frequently
interact with their non-lawyer corporate peers and superiors in settings
outside the litigation context where their sensitivity to their separate roles
may be relaxed and their opinions on non-litigation matters solicited. And,
while it may appear that [in-house counsel's] current responsibilities do not
involve him in situations where the information to which he is exposed in
this lawsuit might be relevant to other responsibilities, his position has
been different in the past and may be different in the future.
Id.
132. 1991 WL 159133, at *2.
133. Section 1651 provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1949).
134. See PPG's Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 17, In re PPG Indus., Inc.,
CA 90-C-6067, Misc. No. 308 (Fed. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter "PPG Petition"]. The
American Corporate Counsel Association filed an amicus curiae brief in support
of PPG's Petition. Response of Amicus Curiae American Corporate Counsel Association in Support of Petitioner, In re PPG Indus., Inc., CA 90-C-6067, Misc.
No. 308 (Fed. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter "Amicus Brief"].
135. PPG Petition, supra note 131, at 4-5.
136. Id. Mr. Levin was not involved with patent filings or prosecution and
he distanced himself from research and development and management when
technical or business decisions were at issue. Id. His only interaction was to
"report on the status of litigation in a manner (as is the case with outside counsel) consistent with his obligations under any Protective Order." Id.
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a "two-hat function," for the corporation.' 3 7 These dual purpose inhouse attorneys may often find themselves precluded from access to
a competitor's confidential information. PPG cited U.S. Steel, Matsushita Electric, Safe Flight, and Boehringer when it argued that
Mr. Levin's "disqualification" from access to defendant's confidential information by the district court was erroneous as a matter of
law and an abuse of discretion. 138 PPG argued that the district
court applied a per se ban on Mr. Levin's access to confidential in13 9
formation based solely upon his status as in-house counsel.
The Federal Circuit denied PPG's petition. At the outset of its
decision, the Federal Circuit observed that both the district court
and the magistrate judge were in "apparent conflict" with U.S. Steel
and Matsushita Electric.140 However, the Federal Circuit decided
not to address the issue because it lacked the authority to review
the district court's ruling. 14 1 Basically, PPG failed to show "that
the situation was so 'extraordinary' as to justify the [Federal Cir142
cuit's] intervention" prior to appeal after final judgment.
It is usually insufficient to make bare allegations that in-house
counsel access is necessary to enable such counsel to participate in
the lawsuit. For example, in another patent infringement action,
Al-Site Corp. v. Opti-Ray, Inc.,143 defendant sought in-house counsel access to the confidential information produced under the protective order governing the case. The only reason proffered by
defendant for such access was that it was necessary for defendant's
"meaningful" participation regarding settlement. 14 4 The district
137. Id. Mr. Levin's sole role is to help prepare and conduct lawsuits and to
determine whether to license or otherwise avoid or settle litigation. Id.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 7-9. The ACCA's amicus brief characterized the PPG district
court's decision as "simply an anachronism" in view of U.S. Steel. See Amicus
Brief, supra note 134, at 6-7. Instead of arguing that Mr. Levin was entitled to
access, the ACCA claimed that the district court applied an "inappropriate
standard" in determining the scope of access. Id. at 2 n.2. In addition, the
ACCA noted that a court should consider the following factors:

1. Does counsel have a non-legal role with the client? If counsel has a
non-legal role, does the confidential information at issue relate to the nonlegal role?

2. Does counsel maintain independent files and records? If not, is it

feasible to implement such a system to safeguard confidential materials?

3. Is the client represented by both employed and retained counsel? If

so, which attorneys are best suited, by specialty and function, to review and

analyze the confidential information at issue?
Id. at 9. The ACCA also proposed that the above criteria apply to all counsel,
whether in-house or outside counsel. Id. at 10.
140. In re PPG Indus., Inc., Misc. Docket No. 308 at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2,

1991).
141. Id. at *3.
142. In re PPG Indus., Inc., Misc. Docket No. at *2-3 (citing Will v. United
States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967), and Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S.
33, 34 (1980)).
143. No. CV-91-1770, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13454 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 1992).
144. Id. at *1-2.
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court denied access, noting: (1) settlement did not appear viable at
the time; and (2) granting access to defendant's in-house counsel
145
"might place plaintiffs at a disadvantage with their competitor."
This decision illustrates an apparent reliance, at least in part, on
the rationale of "competitive decisionmaking" and the risk146of inadvertent disclosure set forth in U.S. Steel and its progeny.
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,147 illustrates that the issue of in-house counsel access to confidential materials may also arise in a copyright or trade
secret action. In Brown Bag, the plaintiff sued defendant for copyright infringement and various state law claims related to computer software. 148 The parties agreed that certain source codes and
other information produced in discovery by defendant were trade
secrets, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and thus, they
initially stipulated that they would restrict access to such information to outside counsel "eyes only." 149 Plaintiff later sought direct
access to this information for its in-house counsel.
The district court permitted plaintiffs access to defendant's
confidential information only through an "outside consultant." 150
The magistrate judge stated that, if the outside consultant determined in-house counsel access was necessary as to specific materials, the court would consider an item by item request for those
materials deemed necessary. 15 1 Thus, the court did not totally preclude the possibility of in-house counsel access to confidential
materials. 152 Nevertheless, the plaintiff appealed the district
court's restrictions on in-house counsel access.
At the outset of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that it
balances "the risk to [defendant] of inadvertent disclosure of [its]
145. Id. at *2.
146. See U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 n.3 (using the "competitive decisionmaking" test in determining whether in-house counsel should have access). But
see Pfeiffer v. K-Mart Corp., 106 F.R.D. 235 (S.D. Fla. 1985). In Pfeiffer, the
defendants, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), moved for a protective order to
prevent disclosure to plaintiff of certain technical information deemed by defendants to be "commercial, trade secret and confidential." Id. at 236.
Although the information sought embodied the defendant's trade secret, proprietary and commercially sensitive information, "since such 'confidential information' is undoubtedly relevant to this case, this information must be disclosed to
plaintiff, with certain restrictions imposed, in order that the parties may fully
litigate their claims." Id. Accordingly, the district court entered a protective
order which provided, inter alia, that such confidential information was to be
accessible to "Qualified Persons" as defined in the order, including "in-house
counsel for the parties engaged in preparing this action for trial and their legal
staff." Id. at 236-37.
147. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992).
148. Id. at 1469.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1469.
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trade secrets to competitors against the risk to [plaintiff] that protection of [defendant's] trade secrets impaired prosecution of plaintiffs claims." 15 3 The Ninth Circuit cited U.S. Steel as "the leading
authority on protective orders distinguishing between outside and
in-house counsel,"15 4 and also observed:
[P]roper review of protective orders in cases such as this requires the
district court to examine factually all the risks and safeguards surrounding inadvertent disclosure by any counsel, whether in-house or
retained. Further, the nature of the claims and of a party's opportunity to develop its case through alternative discovery procedures
15 5 factors into decisions on the propriety of such protective orders.
Upon review of the details of the magistrate judge's evidentiary
hearing, the Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiff "did not dispute
the dangers inadvertent disclosure posed to defendant." 156 Instead,
the plaintiff sought to assure the court that in-house counsel's
"professional integrity" and "his promise to store the confidential
material in a locked file cabinet" outweighed such dangers.'5 7 Additionally, the magistrate judge focused on the fact that the plaintiffs in-house counsel served as the plaintiffs only legal advisor and
personnel manager.' 5 8 Furthermore, since the plaintiff hired its inhouse counsel only a few weeks prior to the hearing, the attorney
had little or no knowledge of the duties of fellow employees. 15 9 The
in-house counsel also acknowledged that he was responsible for advising plaintiff "on a gamut of legal issues, including contracts,
marketing and employment."160 Since the plaintiffs in-house counsel participated in "competitive decisionmaking," the magistrate
judge denied access in accordance with U.S. Steel.' 6 The Ninth
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
issuing the protective order denying plaintiffs in-house counsel access to defendant's confidential information, other than as
62
specified.1
These cases denying access to in-house counsel illustrate a judicial concern that a lack of present involvement in competitive
153. Id. at 1470.
154. Id. (also citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. United States, 929 F.2d 1577,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
155. Id. at 1470 (emphasis in original).
156. Id. at 1471.
157. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1471.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. In addition, the magistrate judge found that the existing protective
order did not significantly impair plaintiffs ability to prosecute its claims, as
plaintiffs outside counsel already had over six months to study defendant's confidential information, "had ample time to develop any admissible evidence"
before the court-ordered deadline for discovery had passed, and could utilize the
provisions of the existing protective order to seek access to essential documents.
Id.
162. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1470-71.
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decisionmaking may be insufficient to support access to confidential
information. Courts seek some sort of additional assurance that
the corporation will not place the in-house counsel in a situation, at
some future time, which may jeopardize the confidentiality of the
information. In addition, some courts have taken the view that arguments of necessity are insufficient unless there are compelling
circumstances that warrant access to the information.

IV.

ANALYSIS

As the foregoing cases demonstrate, whether a court permits
in-house. counsel access to another party's confidential discovery
materials is a highly fact-specific determination. Such a determination must take account of the Federal Circuit's mandate in U.S.
Steel that the test for whether in-house counsel access is proper depends upon whether such access will present "an unacceptable opportunity for inadvertent disclosure" of confidential discovery
materials. 16 3 As observed by the Federal Circuit in U.S. Steel and
in Matsushita Electric, the risk of inadvertent disclosure depends
primarily on the extent to which in-house counsel participate in the
164
competitive decisionmaking of their corporate employer.
Although the determination of the risk of inadvertent disclosure
and the extent of participation in "competitive decisionmaking" requires a detailed review of the specific facts relating to particular
in-house counsel activities in a given case, a close review of the existing case law reveals several prominent factors which practitioners must address in evaluating the likelihood of a court's grant or
denial of such access.
First, this section analyzes the effect of in-house counsel's title
and position, including any personal relationship with the corporation or its officers which may lead to a conflict of interest. Second,
it examines the status of in-house patent counsel who play an integral role in product design and other respects of the corporation's
business. Third, this section discusses the effect of in-house counsel
affidavits and how their drafting may result in either a grant or
denial of access. Fourth, it considers how the complexity of the litigation and the need for in-house counsel's specialized knowledge
factor into the entire analysis.
A.

Status As Corporate Officer, Director or Shareholder

Matsushita Electric made it clear that the mere showing that
in-house counsel has regular contact with corporate officials involved in policymaking or corporate decisionmaking is insufficient
163. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
164. See id. at 1468 n.3; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. United States,

929 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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to establish that a court should preclude in-house counsel access to
confidential discovery materials. 16 5 Indeed, the party seeking to
preclude access must show that in-house counsel actually advises
and participates in corporate competitive decisionmaking for such
166
preclusion to be proper.
Though not dispositive, courts often consider the title or position of a particular in-house counsel when evaluating whether inhouse counsel actually advises and participates in competitive decisionmaking. For example, in MatsushitaElectric in-house counsel
was a corporate officer having the titles of "General Counsel," "Senior Vice President" and "Secretary" of the corporation. 16 7 Nevertheless, the court permitted in-house counsel access because the
record established that, despite these titles, in-house counsel's activities were primarily legal in nature.' 6 8 Therefore in-house counsel "was sufficiently insulated from competitive decisionmaking ..... ,,169 Similarly, in Glaxo Inc. v. Genpharm Pharmacheuticals, although in-house counsel was a "high level employee" and
"substantial investor" in Glaxo, the court granted in-house counsel
0

access. 17

In contrast, in Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel Corp.,
the court denied two in-house counsel having titles of "General
Counsel" and "Director of Patents," respectively, access to confidential discovery materials. 17 1 The Allegheny court found that a risk of
inadvertent disclosure existed, in part, because the General Counsel was a corporate officer. 172 In addition, in CarpenterTechnology
Corp. v. Armco, Inc., an in-house "Senior Staff Attorney" who was
neither a corporate officer nor a member of the corporation's board
1 73
of directors received access to confidential discovery materials.
However, the court denied access to the in-house "Director of Law,"
who was a corporate officer, but not a director, of the corporation. 174 Unlike the "Senior Staff Attorney," the "Director of Law"
175
had the authority to, inter alia, settle litigation.
Thus, although in-house counsel status as a corporate officer,
director or shareholder alone will not automatically thwart access
to confidential discovery materials, such status does raise the level
of scrutiny which a court is likely to employ in evaluating whether
165. Matsushita Electric, 929 F.2d at 1580.
166. Id. at 1579-80.

167. Id. at 1580.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 796 F. Supp. 872, 874 (E.D.N.C. 1992).

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

No. 89-5940, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 867, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1990).
Id. at *6-7.
132 F.R.D. 24, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 28-29.
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in-house counsel actually advises and participates in corporate
competitive decisionmaking. This generally seems prudent, as the
likelihood is greater that in-house counsel serving as a corporate
officer or director will participate in the corporation's competitive
decisionmaking. However, shareholder status alone should not
raise the level of scrutiny applied by the court, given the usual lack
of involvement by shareholders in corporate decisionmaking.
Similarly, in the case of small or closely-held corporations, the
extent of in-house counsel's personal relationship to the corporation
and its officers will also bear on the determination of whether inhouse counsel participates in competitive decisionmaking. For example, in A. Hirsh v. United States, the in-house counsel denied
access to confidential materials was both a corporate officer and a
member of the Hirsh family. 176 The court relied heavily upon these
factors in determining that the in-house counsel was not sufficiently isolated from the policymaking elements of the corporation,
177
and therefore, could not have access to such materials.
In view of the foregoing, it seems clear that the greater the likelihood of conflict between in-house counsel's duty to the corporate
entity and ability to segregate confidential discovery materials from
the corporation, the less likely it is that a court will grant access.
This general proposition is consistent with the manner in which
courts handle in-house counsel representation in other contexts,
such as in shareholder derivative litigation. For example, in In re
Oracle Securities Litigation,178 in-house general counsel played a
significant role in reaching a settlement agreement to resolve a
shareholder derivative suit brought against some of the corporation's senior executive officers and directors. The district court disapproved of the settlement, in part because it found that Oracle's
in-house general counsel had an inherent conflict of interest between representation of the corporation and its individual directors
and officers. 179 In the Oracle court's view, "[r]epresentation of the
corporation's interests by in-house counsel does not ameliorate this
conflict, for in-house attorneys are inevitably subservient to the interests of the defendant directors and officers whom they serve."18 0
Taken to its logical conclusion, Oracle appears to come close to
the per se rejection of in-house counsel independence that the Federal Circuit repudiated in U.S. Steel and Matsushita Electric. Yet,
176. 657 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
177. Id.; see Carpenter,132 F.R.D. at 27-28 (noting that both in-house counsel particularly noted in their affidavits that they were unrelated, by blood or

marriage, to any of the corporation's officers or employees).
178. 829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
179. Id. at 1189-90.
180. Id. at 1188 (citation omitted). For additional comments on Oracle and
other in-house counsel issues, see generally Daniel S. Hapke, Jr., Equal Status
Is Still In-House Goal, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 15, 1993, at S10.
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one may reconcile the Oracle view of in-house counsel with U.S.
Steel and its progeny. The disclosure of confidential discovery
materials to in-house counsel presumes a suitable protective order
entered into by the parties and approved by the court. While there
may be tension between in-house counsel's dual loyalties to the corporate entity and individuals who are part of management or the
board of directors, there is no basis for presuming that in-house
counsel will violate a protective order of the court. Indeed, cases
such as U.S. Steel and Boehringer presume exactly the opposite.
B. Status As Patent Counsel
In U.S. Steel and MatsushitaElectric, the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected any per se rule that in-house counsel status alone
prevents access to confidential discovery materials. 81' Indeed, the
Federal Circuit's recognition of the professionalism of in-house
counsel is consistent, albeit in a different context, with the U.S.
82
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States.
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court established that the attorney-client
privilege applies to communications between in-house counsel and
8 3
other corporate employees regarding legal matters.'
However, U.S. Steel also specifically identified "product design"
as one of the areas of corporate affairs which was likely to involve
in-house counsel in "competitive decisionmaking." i8 4 This is of particular concern and importance to in-house patent counsel who seek
such access, as they often take part to some extent in "product design" in the course of their activities. This participation may involve interacting with inventors, analyzing others' patents, as well
as providing legal advice on patent validity and infringement issues, and in the course of patent-related licensing or other contractual matters.
C. Weight of the Factors
Safe Flight,Carpenter,Boehringerand Glaxo highlight the tensions inherent in evaluating the relative weight of the factors a
court considers in its analysis of a particular in-house counsel's involvement in competitive decisionmaking. For example, in Safe
Flight, the court allowed access, at least in part, because in-house
181. U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468; Matsushita Electric, 929 F.2d at 1580.
182. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
183. Id. at 395-97; see also United States v. Aronson, 610 F. Supp. 217, 22021 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (noting that Upjohn authorizes the invocation of attorney-client privilege in a corporate context), affd, 781 F.2d 1580 (11th Cir.

1986); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1975) (ruling that,
when in-house counsel acts as an attorney, the confidences revealed by the
counsel's corporate client in the process of communication are treated in the

same manner as those to any other attorney).
184. U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 n.3.
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counsel neither conducted scientific research nor prosecuted patents.' 8 5 Similarly, in Carpenter,the court permitted one in-house
counsel access because, inter alia, he was not involved in the technical aspects (e.g. product design and development) of his employer.' 8 6 Yet the court also reasoned that, given the "technical
nature" of the case, in-house counsel's "specialized knowledge of the
steel industry" also favored his access to defendant's confidential
187
information.
In contrast, the Boehringercourt found in favor of access for six
in-house attorneys, in part because of the "necessity" of the attorneys' involvement in the litigation.18 8 Yet at least some of the attorneys granted access were patent attorneys with specialized
technical knowledge, including one of the attorneys who prosecuted
the patent in suit.' 8 9 Similarly, in Glaxo, in-house patent counsel
received access, although the court specifically noted that the patent counsel in question was not involved in scientific research. 190
Thus, despite the Safe Flight's implication that in-house patent
counsel should not have access to confidential materials, Boehringer and Glaxo make it clear that status as in-house patent counsel cannot per se preclude such access. However, as illustrated in
Allegheny, courts have looked closely at the particular duties of a
patent counsel to determine whether that attorney engages in competitive decisionmaking and whether the risk of inadvertent disclosure mandates preclusion of access to confidential materials
produced during discovery.
A court may ameliorate the risk of inadvertent disclosure by
requiring a showing that in-house counsel will be able to segregate
themselves from the competitive decisionmaking activities of the
corporation. For example, in Boehringer, there was a strong showing that in-house counsel (including patent counsel) having access
to confidential discovery materials could segregate themselves from
other potentially conflicting projects. Apparently, the ability of inhouse counsel (including patent counsel) in Boehringerto segregate
themselves from "conflicting work" was an important factor which
tipped the scales in favor of in-house counsel access, despite the
Safe Flight court's implication that in-house counsel who prosecute
patents should be precluded from access to confidential discovery
185. Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control, Inc., 682 F.
Supp. 20, 22 (D. Del. 1988).
186. Carpenter, 132 F.R.D. at 28.
187. Id.
188. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.. Hercon Labs., 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1166, 1168 (D. Del. 1990).
189. Id. at 1168. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this issue.
190. Glaxo, 796 F. Supp. at 874.
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materials. 191 Similarly, in Glaxo, in-house counsel represented
that he would segregate himself from other matters involving the
19 2
technical subject matter area of the patent in suit.
The suggestion in Safe Flight is that the notion that an inhouse counsel's participation in patent prosecution or scientific research is enough to preclude in-house counsel access, is overbroad,
as well as inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's rejection of any
per se ban on in-house counsel access based upon status as in-house
counsel alone. Similarly, the district court's affirmance of preclusion of in-house counsel access in PPG Industries was tantamount
to application of the prohibited per se ban on in-house counsel access. In particular, the magistrate judge's speculation in PPG Industries (apparently endorsed by the district court) as to the
possibility that future activities of in-house counsel might involve
that attorney in competitive decisionmaking appear not only unfounded, but also in direct conflict with the framework of analysis
for this issue established by U.S. Steel and Matsushita Electric.
D. Other In-House Counsel Activities
The only other factor specifically identified in U.S. Steel as
bearing on the competitive decisionmaking analysis is whether in19 3
house counsel participate in activities relating to "pricing."
However, courts have reviewed a number of other specific in-house
counsel activities to determine whether in-house counsel participate in "competitive decisionmaking" of the corporation.
For example, in Matsushita Electric, the Federal Circuit observed that in-house counsel's affidavit established that he had no
involvement in decisions relating to pricing, product design, vendor
selection or marketing strategy, and that his duties were primarily
legal in nature.19 4 Accordingly, the court allowed in-house counsel
access. 195 Similarly, in Glaxo, in-house counsel established by affidavits that he had no involvement in and gave no advice to his corporate employer about competitive decisions in the areas of pricing,
scientific research, sales or marketing. 196 Again, the court permitted in-house counsel access. 19 7 In contrast, in Brown Bag, the court
refused in-house counsel access, in part because in-house counsel
was responsible for providing advice "on a gamut of legal issues,
191. Cf Safe Flight, 682 F. Supp. at 22 (stating that a court should grant
access to in-house counsel who "neither conduct scientific research'nor prosecute patents").
192. Glaxo, 796 F. Supp. at 874.
193. U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 n.3.
194. Matsushita Electric, 929 F.2d at 1579-80.
195. Id.
196. Glaxo, 796 F. Supp. at 874.
197. Id.
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including contracts, marketing and employment." 198
A party may utilize in-house counsel affidavits to establish the
nature of a particular in-house counsel's activities.199 Yet, an attorney must carefully draft these affidavits in order to avoid equivocation and to precisely state the nature of in-house counsel's duties
and responsibilities. In Carpenter, the in-house counsel who received access established in his affidavit that he had "absolutely no
involvement" in decisions relating to pricing, marketing, product
design or production. 200 However, the in-house counsel who was
denied access stated in his affidavit that he had "no direct responsibility or authority" relating to decisions regarding pricing, product
design or production. 20 1 Comparing the two affidavits, the court
concluded that the latter in-house counsel must have had "some involvement, albeit probably small, with competitive decisions," or
the two affidavits would have been more similar.20 2 Accordingly,
the court denied access to confidential materials because it found
that even indirect responsibility or authority over competitive decisionmaking was sufficient to bar such access.
In view of Carpenter, practitioners should carefully draft and
review affidavits submitted by in-house counsel in support of a motion seeking access by such counsel to confidential discovery materials. In addition, the submission of such affidavits may lead to a
deposition of the in-house counsel affiant, or even an evidentiary
hearing before the court, to enable the opposing party to test the
averments made in the affidavit. Accordingly, one should closely
scrutinize any such affidavits prior to submission, both to confirm
the veracity of the affidavit and to avoid potentially detrimental
cross-examination testimony of the in-house counsel affiant, which
may be, at a minimum, embarrassing or even may undermine the
credibility of the substantive positions of the in-house counsel's corporate employer.
E. Additional Factors
In determining whether a court should permit or deny in-house
counsel access, a court may consider several several additional factors within the U.S. Steel analysis. First, a court may address the
complexity of the litigation. 20 3 Second, it may consider whether the
disclosure sought arises at an initial or advanced stage in the litiga198. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1470-71 (9th
Cir. 1992).
199. Ordinarily, counsel attaches the affidavits to a motion for a protective
order brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
200. Carpenter, 132 F.R.D. at 27-28.
201. Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).
202. Id.

203. U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:657

tion. 20 4 Third, it may also consider the extent to which precluding
in-house counsel access would create a hardship to the party seek20 5
ing access.
A party seeking in-house counsel access is likely to emphasize
the complexity of the litigation and the need for in-house counsel
expertise to achieve effective representation of the corporate party.
This view finds support in, inter alia, the Carpentercourt's observation that in-house counsel's "specialized knowledge" could be vital
to the proper handling of the litigation by outside counsel. 20 6 However, one may also argue that in-house counsel expertise is often
less than vital to effective representation, given the availability of
independent expert witnesses and technically-trained outside
counsel.
Cases in their initial litigation stages generally favor in-house
counsel access because the corporation may employ in-house counsel expertise through all phases of pre-trial discovery and trial
preparation. However, if discovery is in its later stages or near
completion, a court is more likely to preclude in-house counsel access, as outside counsel has presumably effectively handled discovery and developed admissible evidence for trial without the
20 7
assistance of in-house counsel.
Precluding in-house counsel access will undoubtedly work a
hardship on the corporate party seeking such access. The most obvious hardships are the loss of in-house counsel expertise and the
concomitant increased expense of relying upon independent experts
or additional outside counsel to analyze confidential discovery
materials produced. However, a court will weigh the foregoing factors against the hardship suffered by the party opposing access
if
20 8
such access causes a competitive disadvantage to that party.
Although it initially seems a pro forma matter, in-house counsel seeking access to confidential discovery materials should also
seek admission to the court where the action is pending. If the action is pending in a court other than one in which in-house counsel
is already admitted, outside counsel should make a motion for inhouse counsel admission pro hac vice, preferably before the issue of
in-house counsel access is litigated. As noted in Boehringer, in204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Carpenter, 132 F.R.D. at 28.
207. See, e.g., Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1470-71 (explaining that the court
denied in-house counsel access because, inter alia, outside counsel had over six
months to review confidential discovery materials and had sufficient time to
develop admissible evidence before discovery closed).
208. See, e.g., Amsted Indus., No. 88-C924, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9413, at *4
(finding that the benefit to plaintiff from additional assistance of in-house counsel access was outweighed by danger of competitive harm which might result
from such access).
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house counsel are officers of the court and, like retained counsel,
are subject to sanctions if the court views their behavior as improper. 20 9 Indeed, the Carpenter court conditioned in-house counsel access upon the counsel's admission to practice before the
court.

2 10

Finally, a party seeking in-house counsel access to confidential
discovery materials should take care to insure that the issue has
been adequately addressed prior to the entering of any protective
order. As observed in Allegheny, the burden is higher in convincing
a court to modify a previously entered protective order. This is parthe order is one that arose through stipulation
ticularly true when
211
of the parties.
V.

CONCLUSION

Both in-house and outside counsel should be aware that the issue of in-house counsel access to confidential discovery materials
may arise in the course of intellectual property litigation. Practitioners must be aware of the Federal Circuit's primary criterion of
competitive decisionmaking set forth in U.S. Steel and Matsushita
Electric. Additional factors which bear on the issue include: what
duties a particular in-house attorney has within the corporation;
the ability of the in-house attorney to be segregated from the competitive decisionmaking of the corporation; the nature of the averments made in any affidavits supporting in-house counsel access;
the necessity shown for such access; and even whether such counsel
is admitted to the bar of the court in which the matter is being litigated. Accordingly, a court must evaluate each case in its own factual context in view of all of the foregoing factors. Attorneys who
take early notice of U.S. Steel and its progeny may, through careful
pleading and succinct affidavits, be able to minimize costly and
time-consuming satellite litigation relating to the access of in-house
counsel to confidential discovery materials.

209. Boehringer, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1168.
210. Carpenter, 132 F.R.D. at 28.
211. Allegheny, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 867, at *4.

